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AUTOMATIC STAYS AND GOVERNMENTAL
OPERATIONS: HOW NEW YORK STATE
PROTECTS THE GOVERNMENT FROM
THE POOR
Jack E. Pace III*
Procedural justice for the poor is a matter of life and death. For
the poor plaintiff, a lawsuit typically involves the basic means of
survival for the plaintiff's family.' Fair procedures, therefore, are
necessary to ensure that a court does not unjustly deny a poor fam-
ily its subsistence.2
Two New York state procedural rules endanger the poor by giv-
ing special treatment to the defendant whom low income plaintiffs
most often face in court. The New York Civil Practice Law and
Rules ("CPLR") allows the government an automatic stay, pend-
ing appeal, of all proceedings to enforce an adverse judgment or
order.4 The New York Court of Appeals' "governmental opera-
tions" 5 rule creates a presumption against certifying class actions
when the challenged action is a governmental operation. Neither
rule exists in federal court.6
* J.D. Candidate, 1998, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 1995, Ford-
ham University, Fordham College. The author thanks Professor Matthew Diller,
Fordham University School of Law, for his insightful comments and suggestions. The
author also thanks the Homeless Family Rights Project of the New York Legal Aid
Society for this Note's inspiration. Finally, the author thanks Colleen A. Tuily for her
patience, criticism and support.
1. As Justice Brennan wrote in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970), "ter-
mination of aid... may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to
live while he waits. Since he lacks independent resources, his situation becomes im-
mediately desperate."
2. Id. at 261 ("'[T]o cut off a welfare recipient in the face of. . . "brutal need"
without a prior hearing of some sort is unconscionable, unless overwhelming consid-
erations justify it."') (quoting Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 899-900 (S.D.N.Y.
1968), affd, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)).
3. As this Note shows, the frequency with which these rules come into play, along
with the importance of the class action device for the poor, makes the two rules signif-
icant limitations on the legal access of low income plaintiffs. For a discussion of addi-
tional New York rules favoring government defendants, see Marcia Robinson Lowry,
Justice's Rusted Wheels, MANHA"ITAN LAWYER, Nov. 29, 1988, at 12.
4. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. § 5519(a)(1) (McKinney 1996).
5. Rivera v. Trimarco, 36 N.Y.2d 747, 749, 329 N.E.2d 661, 661, 368 N.Y.S.2d 826,
827 (1975).
6. See infra Parts I.A.3 and I.B.3, describing relevant federal practice.
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A New York plaintiff with little or no income likely will face at
least one of these two rules in the course of a lawsuit. First, a poor
person who does not receive the assistance to which she is entitled
under a government program 7 must get a judgment or order
against the government to recover. Second, a class action is often
the only available means of court access for a poor plaintiff unable
to afford legal services. 8 As a result, in addition to creating proce-
dural disparity with federal courts,9 New York rules postponing
7. Many poor people depend on government programs to supplement, albeit
meagerly, their incomes. For example, in 1991, sixty percent of children in poverty,
and forty nine percent of all people in poverty, received benefits from the Aid to
Families with Dependant Children ("AFDC") program. 1994 GREEN BOOK 399 tbl.
10-26 (1994). The reader should note, however, that public assistance benefits do not
even raise a family's income to the poverty line. See Peter T. Kilborn, Welfare All
Over the Map, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1996, at E3. In addition, benefit levels have con-
sistently decreased since 1970. See id.
8. The level of unmet legal need among the poor is great. According to a recent
legal needs study,
40.5% of all poor households in New York City reported having at least one
unmet need in the housing category; 21.3% reported at least one problem
involving public benefits for which they were unable to obtain legal assist-
ance; and 15.3% reported at least one consumer problem for which they
were unable to obtain counsel.
The Steering Committee on Legal Assistance, Lawyers and the Poor in New York
City-1996: The Association of the Bar of the City of New York's Civil Justice Crisis
Plan, 51 THE RECORD 708, 711 (citing NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, THE
NEW YORK LEGAL NEEDS STUDY (1993) (defining an "unmet legal need" as a need
arising from a problem which would merit an attorney's professional attention and for
which no legal assistance had been obtained)).
In addition, recent laws preventing lawyers at organizations receiving Legal Serv-
ices Corporation funds from representing clients participating in class actions further
decrease poor people's access to legal services. See Omnibus Consolidated Rescis-
sions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 504(a)(7), 110 Stat. 1321
(1996) ("None of the funds appropriated in this Act to the Legal Services Corporation
may be used to provide financial assistance to any person or entity ... that initiates or
participates in a class action suit.").
9. This disparity raises a serious issue beyond the scope of this Note. In addition
to their effect on the poor, the automatic stay and governmental operations rule illus-
trate a flaw in the reasoning behind restrictions on federal court access. The United
States Supreme Court has justified such restrictions with the assumption that state
courts protect individual rights as well as federal courts do. See, e.g., Steffel v.
Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1974) (stressing the need to avoid the "unseemly
failure to give effect to the principle that state courts have the solemn responsibility,
equally with federal courts 'to guard, enforce, and protect every right granted or se-
cured by the constitution of the United States"') (quoting Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S.
624, 637 (1884)); Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the Allocation of Judicial Business
between State and Federal Courts: Federal Jurisdiction and "The Martian Chronicles",
78 VA. L. REV. 1769, 1825 (1992) ("[Tlhe modern Supreme Court has long premised
its structuring of federal and state judicial relations on the assumptions that state and
federal courts are fungible.").
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judgments against the government, or limiting class actions, deny
relief to plaintiffs who must rely on such judgments or actions.
. This Note examines the automatic stay and the governmental op-
erations rule and argues that they unfairly limit the ability of poor
plaintiffs to recover against the government in New York state
courts. Part I defines the automatic stay and governmental opera-
tions rule. Part II describes the impact of the rules on the poor,
including the inadequacy of the existing means of relief under the
rules. Part III considers several alternatives to the rules and pro-
poses that the New York Legislature repeal the automatic stay and
that the New York Court of Appeals eliminate the governmental
operations rule. The Note concludes that the harm caused to poor
plaintiffs overshadows any purported benefit of applying these two
unique rules.
I. The Rules
A. The Government's Automatic Stay
CPLR 5519(a)(1) 10 grants an automatic stay to a governmental
entity 1 appealing an adverse judgment or order.' 2 Service by the
government of the notice or affidavit required for an appeal stays
automatically all proceedings to enforce the judgment or order ap-
However, state court rules, which do not exist in federal courts, inhibiting a party's
ability to obtain relief call into question this adequacy assumption. For New York
plaintiffs challenging a government practice, unique state rules favoring government
defendants make state courts inadequate substitutes for federal courts.
For a discussion of New York state court rules, nonexistent in federal courts, that
restrict plaintiffs' ability to pursue constitutional claims, see Burt Neuborne, Toward
Procedural Parity in Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 725, 737-47
(1981). For discussions of additional factors that give plaintiffs in federal court an
advantage over their state court counterparts, see Burt Neuborne, Parity Revisited:
The Uses of a Judicial Forum of Excellence, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 797 (1995), and Burt
Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1105 (1977).
10. N.Y. CiV. PRAC. L. & R. § 5519(a)(1) (McKinney 1996).
11. The automatic stay applies to all governmental entities, including: school dis-
tricts, see Koch v. Webster Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 112 Misc. 2d 10, 445 N.Y.S.2d
874 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1981), the Metropolitan Transit Authority and its sub-
sidiary the Long Island Railroad, see Grant v. MTA, 96 Misc. 2d 683, 409 N.Y.S.2d
570 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978), the city commissioner of public welfare, see Rexford
v. Miller, 143 Misc. 303, 256 N.Y.S. 449 (Sup. Ct. Schenectady County 1932), and the
manager of a town building department, see Wuttke v. O'Connor, 202 Misc. 550, 115
N.Y.S.2d 852 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1952).
12. The section reads in part:
(a) Stay without court order. Service upon the adverse party of a notice of
appeal or an affidavit of intention to move for permission to appeal stays all
proceedings to enforce the judgment or order appealed from pending the
appeal or determination on the motion for permission to appeal where:
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pealed from.' 3 Non-governmental appellants wishing to obtain a
stay must either fit into an enumerated category 14 or apply for a
discretionary stay.' 5
Section 5519(a)(1) stays only "proceedings to enforce "16 a judg-
ment or order appealed from. During the stay, the prevailing party
may not use available legal methods 17 to force the government to
obey the judgment or order. Most departments of the Appellate
Division hold that trial and pretrial proceedings, after the govern-
ment appeals an order denying its motion to dismiss or for sum-
mary judgment, are not proceedings to enforce. 8 An order
denying a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment is "self-exe-
cuting."' 9 The order needs no enforcement because, upon entry, it
1. the appellant or moving party is the state or any political subdivision of
the state or any officer of the state or of any political subdivision of the state
Id.
13. Id.
14. The categories include judgments or orders for: the payment of a sum of
money, the assignment or delivery of personal property, the execution of any instru-
ment, the conveyance or deliverance of real property in the possession or control of
the appellant or moving party, the sale of any mortgaged property and the payment of
any deficiency, and the performance of two or more of the above acts. See
§ 5519(a)(2-7). To get the stay, the appellant must both fit into one of these catego-
ries and give the undertaking specified by the relevant subparagraph. See id. In addi-
tion, § 5519(b) provides for an automatic stay in an action defended by an insurer.
See § 5519(b).
15. In cases that do not fall under subdivision (a) or (b), subdivision (c) allows
either the court of original instance or the court from or to which the appeal is taken
to stay enforcement proceedings pending appeal or determination on the motion for
permission to appeal. See § 5519(c).
16. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. § 5519(a)(1) (McKinney 1996).
17. See, e.g., N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. art. 51 (entitled "Enforcement of Judgments
and Orders Generally").
18. See Pokoik v. Dep't of Health Servs., 220 A.D.2d 13, 641 N.Y.S.2d 881 (2d
Dep't 1996) (per curiam); Schwartz v. New York City Hous. Auth., 219 A.D.2d 47,
641 N.Y.S.2d 885 (2d Dep't 1996) (per curiam); Pickerell v. Town of Huntington, 219
A.D.2d 24, 641 N.Y.S.2d 887 (2d Dep't 1996) (per curiam); Shorten v. City of White
Plains, 216 A.D.2d 344, 631 N.Y.S.2d 519 (2d Dep't 1995) (mem.).
The Third and Fourth departments also hold that the automatic stay does not apply
to trial and pretrial proceedings. See Baker v. Bd. of Educ. of W. Irondequoit Sch.
Dist., 152 A.D.2d 1014, 544 N.Y.S.2d 258 (4th Dep't 1989) (holding that school dis-
trict's filing of a notice of appeal from an order denying its motion for summary judg-
ment did not automatically stay the trial); Walker v. Delaware & Hudson R.R., 120
A.D.2d 919, 503 N.Y.S.2d 173 (3d Dep't 1986) (holding that statutory stay did not
prevent trial following the partial denial of a motion for summary judgment).
The First Department, however, has held to the contrary. See Cabreaja v. New
York City Health and Hosps. Corp., 201 A.D.2d 319, 607 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1st Dep't
1994) (reversing and vacating order denying motion to dismiss in case where appeal
from order stayed the trial).
19. Pokoik, 220 A.D.2d at 17, 641 N.Y.S.2d at 885.
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terminates the government's motion.20 Trial and pretrial proceed-
ings do not enforce these orders. Rather, these proceedings are the
results of such orders. 21 Therefore, section 5519(a)(1) does not
stay trial and pretrial proceedings.22 To stay these proceedings the
state must move for a discretionary stay under subdivision (c).23
In State v. Town of Haverstraw,24 the Second Department of the
Appellate Division held that prohibitory orders are self-executing
and outside the scope of the automatic stay.25 The court held that
CPLR 5519(a)(1) did not automatically stay an order prohibiting
the state from closing a landfill.26 Because the prohibitory order
directed the state to do nothing, it required no execution.2 7 In ad-
dition, the prohibitory order performed the function of a stay,
which is to maintain the status quo.2 8 Executory29 orders, on the
other hand, which command a party to act, usually change the sta-
tus quo.30 The court held that CPLR 5519(a)(1) automatically
stays only executory orders.31 Therefore, the automatic stay did
not apply to the order prohibiting the landfill closure. 32 Applica-
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Pokoik, 220 A.D.2d at 15, 641 N.Y.S.2d at 884; Schwartz, 219 A.D.2d at 48, 641
N.Y.S.2d at 886; Pickerell, 219 A.D.2d at 26, 641 N.Y.S.2d at 888; Burlaka v. Greece
Cent. Sch. Dist., 167 Misc. 2d 281, 639 N.Y.S.2d 673 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1996).
23. See § 5519(c).
24. 219 A.D.2d 64, 641 N.Y.S.2d 879 (2d Dep't 1996) (per curiam).
25. See id.
26. See Haverstraw, 219 A.D.2d 64, 641 N.Y.S.2d 879.
27. Id. at 65, 641 N.Y.S.2d at 881 ("Prohibitory injunctions are self-executing and
need no enforcement procedure to compel inaction on the part of the person or entity
restrained."); see Sixth Ave. R.R. v. Gilbert Elevated R.R., 71 N.Y. 430, 433-34 (1877)
("The judgment, so far as it enjoined the defendant, needed no execution."); New
York Mail & Newspaper Transp. Co. v. Shea, 30 A.D. 374, 375, 52 N.Y.S. 5, 5 (2d
Dep't 1898) ("[T]he injunction is of affirmative prohibitive force and executes
itself.").
28. See infra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
29. The court also described orders that require a party to affirmatively do some-
thing as "mandatory" orders. Haverstraw, 219 A.D.2d at 65, 641 N.Y.S.2d at 881.
30. Id.
31. See id. at 65-66, 641 N.Y.S.2d at 880-81.
32. Id. The Haverstraw court pointed out, however, that it desired a change in the
status quo. The landfill closure order had been confirmed by the state Supreme Court
and upheld on appeal. As a result, the reviewing court stated that "[t]he landfill is
open and it should be closed." Id at 66, 641 N.Y.S.2d at 881. Therefore, though the
court held that the automatic stay did not apply to the order prohibiting the landfill
closure, it vacated the order. See id.
Another possible basis for the idea that CPLR 5519(a)(1) does not stay prohibitory
orders lies in the New York state court decisions emphasizing that the automatic stay
does not vacate the order appealed from. See, e.g., Crane v. New York Council 66,
101 A.D.2d 682, 683, 475 N.Y.S.2d 165, 167 (3d Dep't 1984) ("[S]tay may only be used
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tion of the rule in Haverstraw, however, has so far been limited to
the Second Department.33
Finally, the automatic stay applies only to appeals from state trial
courts to state appellate courts.34 When appealing to federal court,
state appellants must file a bond to obtain a stay.35 When appeal-
ing from a lower appellate court to a higher appellate court, the
state must file motion papers, instead of only an affidavit of inten-
tion to appeal. 6
1. Existing Means of Relief from the Automatic Stay
Private parties subject to the automatic stay of CPLR 5519(a)(1)
have two means of relief from the stay. Small business entities may
enforce their judgments or orders against the government after
only fifteen days.37 Non-small-business parties may move to the
court to which the appeal is taken for a vacatur of the stay.38
Parties seeking vacatur of the government's automatic stay face
two difficulties that parties bound by other stays do not encounter.
First, they have a more limited choice of courts to which they may
ask for relief from the stay.39 Second, since the automatic stay re-
flects a public policy of protecting the government from the effects
of adverse determinations pending appeal,4" it is "not lightly to be
vacated."41
as a shield, not a sword . . . ."); Dep't of Hous. Preservation and Dev. of N.Y. v.
Vanway, 123 Misc. 2d 372, 374, 473 N.Y.S.2d 741, 743 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1984) ("[T]he
lower court order survives ... as the law of the case and remains binding until over-
turned.") (preventing appellant Department of Housing Preservation and Develop-
ment from imposing housing standards even though order enjoining the standards was
automatically stayed by CPLR 5519(a)(1)); cf., Danziger v. Gottlieb, 156 A.D. 571,
571, 141 N.Y.S.2d 361, 361 (1st Dep't 1913) (holding private defendant in contempt
for using an enjoined word in connection with one of its products after the order
enjoining the word's use was stayed). Because a stayed order still exists, these courts
have prevented the appellants from violating stayed, prohibitory orders.
33. See, e.g., DeLury v. City of New York, 48 A.D.2d 405, 370 N.Y.S.2d 600 (1st
Dep't 1975) (CPLR 5519(a)(1) automatically stayed order prohibiting City of New
York from laying off union members).
34. Fed. Ins. Co. v. County of Westchester, 921 F. Supp. 1136 (S.D.N.Y. 1996);
Town of Orangetown v. Magee, 216 A.D.2d 343, 631 N.Y.S.2d 41 (2d Dep't 1995).
35. Fed. Ins. Co., 921 F. Supp. at 1136.
36. Town of Orangetown, 216 A.D.2d at 343, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 41-42.
37. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. § 5519(a)(1) (McKinney 1996).
38. See § 5519(c).
39Parties subject to a § 5519(a)(1) stay may apply only to the court to which the
appeal is taken for vacatur of the stay. Id. Parties subject to any other § 5519 stay
may ask the court from or to which the appeal is taken to vacate the stay. Id.
40. See infra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
41. DeLury v. City of New York, 48 A.D.2d 405, 405, 370 N.Y.S.2d 600, 602 (1st
Dep't 1975) (denying motion to vacate automatic stay of preliminary injunction that
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2. The Purpose of the Automatic Stay
By maintaining the status quo 42 pending appeal, the automatic
stay stabilizes the effect of an adverse decision on the govern-
ment.4 3 The stay "preserve[s] public assets" by holding the judg-
ment in abeyance without requiring an undertaking or extra
motion practice. 4 The government, however, may not frivolously
appeal to take advantage of the statutory stay, even if it claims that
an "unprecedented financial condition" prevents it from fulfilling
its obligations to the petitioner.45
Although the New York Legislature enacted the current auto-
matic stay to continue a long-standing 46 New York practice 4 7 the
prohibited the City of New York from laying off union workers). The First Depart-
ment later reversed the injunction against the City. See DeLury, 48 A.D.2d 595, 378
N.Y.S.2d 49 (1975).
42. A possible challenge to some automatic stays lies in the definition of "status
quo." In cases in which plaintiffs challenge an ongoing state practice, one can argue
that "status quo" refers to the plaintiffs' situation before the state began the practice
deemed illegal by the trial court. See, e.g., McCain v. Giuliani, N.Y. L.J., May 16,
1996, at 28 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1996) (homeless families applying for shelter chal-
lenged state practice of forcing them to wait overnight in a welfare office), affid, 653
N.Y.S.2d 556 (1st Dep't 1997). A possible state response is that, since the stay is
meant to protect "public assets," Plowden v. Manganiello, 143 Misc. 2d 446, 449, 540
N.Y.S.2d 1020, 1022 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989), the "status quo" is the existing state prac-
tice, since holding otherwise would force the state to pay the costs of changing its
policy. Such a response would be consistent with the purpose of § 5519(a)(1) unless
ending the prohibited policy has only minimal costs.
43. In re Willoughby Nursing Home v. Axelrod, 113 A.D.2d 617, 619, 498
N.Y.S.2d 497, 498 (3d Dep't 1986) (holding that § 5519(a)(1)'s purpose of protecting
the government after an adverse determination warrants applying the automatic stay
to adverse orders that are nonfinal, as well as final); Grant v. MTA, 96 Misc. 2d 683,
686-87, 409 N.Y.S.2d 570, 572-73 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978) (to protect the Metro-
politan Transit Authority's continued mass transportation policy, staying automati-
cally a requirement that the Authority post a large security bond); DeLury, 48 A.D.2d
at 405, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 602 (1st Dep't 1975) (§ 5519(a)(1) "expresses a public policy
designed to protect 'a political subdivision of the state."') (quoting N.Y. CIv. PRAC.
L. & R. § 5519(a)(1) (McKinney 1996)).
44. Plowden, 143 Misc. 2d at 449, 540 N.Y.S.2d at 1022.
45. In re Troy Police Benevolent and Protective Ass'n, 223 A.D.2d 995, 995-96,
636 N.Y.S.2d 499, 500-01 (3d Dep't 1996).
46. New York State's automatic stay traces back to §§ 1313 and 1314 of the Code
of Civil Procedure ("CCP"). See Act of June 2, 1876, ch. 12, §§ 1313 ("Upon an ap-
peal taken by the people of the State, or by a State officer, or board of State officers,
the service of the notice of appeal perfects the appeal, and stays the execution of the
judgment or order appealed from, without an undertaking or other security."), 1314
(same for municipal corporations), 1876 N.Y. Laws 254; see also People ex rel. Ames
v. Judson, 59 Misc. 538, 539-40, 112 N.Y.S.2d 408, 409-10 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County
1908) (appeal by State Commissioner of Excise of order to issue liquor tax certificate
stayed the order without the giving of any security).
The automatic stay later appeared in the Civil Practice Act ("CPA"). See Act of
May 21, 1920, ch. 925, §§ 570, 571, 1920 N.Y. Laws 201-02. The stay was eventually
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Legislature has amended the stay provision a number of times to
protect private plaintiffs affected by the stay. Section 5519 "unam-
biguous[ly] grant[s] ... authority to the courts to control stays and
the terms on which they may be enjoyed. ' 48 The Civil Practice Act
("CPA") was unclear about both whether courts had the power to
control stays, and if they did, what that power entailed.4 9 The cur-
rent law enables the court from or to which the appeal is taken to
either grant a stay, if one is not automatically provided for, or va-
cate, limit or modify any stay. Under the current law courts may
even vacate, limit or modify the government's automatic stay
under section 5519(a)(1).51 Only the court to which the appeal is
taken may do this. 2 By allowing a court to alter the government's
automatic stay, the Legislature created a way for courts to protect
private parties that did not exist in former practice. 3 Section
5519(c) was intended to prevent unnecessary hardship to private
plaintiffs after a judgment in their favor is stayed. 4
The original version of section 5519(a)(1) limited the govern-
ment's automatic stay to money judgments and orders for the
transfer of real or personal property.55 Legislative committees ad-
ded this limitation in 1962 to "prevent the state's acquiring an un-
fair advantage on appeals, '56 even though the Code of Civil
Procedure ("CCP"), 57 CPA and Advisory Committee's drafts ap-
plied the stay to all judgments and orders. 8
included in the CPLR, which replaced the CPA in 1962. See Act of Apr. 4, ch. 308,
§ 5519(a)(1), 1962 N.Y. Laws 1461.
47. MEM. OF CITY OF NEW YORK, Act of July 2, 1965, ch. 744, 1965 Legis. Ann. 36,
37.
48. WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, 7 NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE 1 5519.02, at 55-
181 (Bender 1996) [hereinafter NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE].
49. See id.
50. N.Y. Clv. PRAC. L. & R. § 5519(c) (McKinney 1996).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE, supra note 48, 5519.15, at 55-201.
54. Id. Compare Clark v. Cuomo, 105 A.D.2d 451, 480 N.Y.S.2d 716 (3d Dep't
1984) (granting motion to vacate stay), with Wuttke v. O'Connor, 202 Misc. 550, 115
N.Y.S.2d 852 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1952) (holding that, in the event of undue
delay following a statutory stay, private party's only remedy was to move to the appel-
late court to dismiss the appeal).
55. Included in the original § 5519(a)(1) were the limiting words: "and the judg-
ment or order directs either the payment of a sum of money, the assignment or deliv-
ery of personal property, or the conveyance of real property." N.Y. Clv. PRAC. L. &
R. § 5519(a)(1) (McKinney 1962).
56. Id. (citing 1962 Sen. Fin. Comm. Rep. 525).
57. See Ames v. Judson, 59 Misc. 538, 539-40, 112 N.Y.S.2d 408, 409-10 (Sup. Ct.
Monroe County 1908).
58. See NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE, supra note 48, 5519.03, at 55-183.
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This concern for government opponents, however, could not de-
feat the New York State Attorney General's intent to conform the
stay to prior practice. A 1965 amendment, adopted at the request
of the Attorney General,59 removed the limitation, allowing the
state to obtain a stay that applied to all judgments and orders with-
out applying for a court order.6°
Finally, in 1988, the Legislature softened the consequences of the
automatic stay for small businesses.6' The automatic stay provision
now provides that where a court, in CPLR 7803(4) proceedings,62
orders reinstatement of a license to a corporation of less than six
stockholders and eleven employees, a partnership of less than six
partners and eleven employees, a proprietorship, or a natural per-
son, the automatic stay shall last only fifteen days.63 This exception
to the automatic stay, along with the unambiguous grant of author-
ity to courts and the attempted limit of the stay to money and prop-
erty judgments, all reflect a concern among legislators for private
parties affected by the stay.
3. Automatic Stays in Federal Court
In federal court, the government does not get a special automatic
stay when it appeals an adverse judgment. Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure ("FRCP") 62(a) 64 stays for ten days proceedings to en-
force judgments against all parties. The rule, however, exempts a
number of orders from even this limited automatic stay. In appeals
from interlocutory or final judgments in an action for an injunction
or a receivership, or a judgment or order for an accounting in a
patent infringement action, the automatic stay does not apply.65 To
stay an order granting, dissolving, or denying an injunction, the
government must move for a discretionary stay.66 A court will
grant a discretionary stay only after balancing the potential harm
to the party whose judgment is stayed with the potential harm to
the party applying for the stay.67
59. See id.
60. See Act of July 2, 1965, ch. 744, § 5519(a)(1), 1965 N.Y. Laws 1770-71.
61. See Act of Aug. 1, 1988, ch. 493, § 5519(a)(1), 1988 N.Y. Laws 2696-97.
62. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. § 7803(4) (McKinney 1996) (allowing a party pro-
ceeding against a body or officer to challenge whether a determination against the
party was supported by substantial evidence).
63. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 5519(a)(1) (McKinney 1996).
64. FED. R. Civ. P. 62(a).
65. Id.
66. FED. R. Civ. P. 62(c).
67. WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, 11 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL
2D § 2904, at 501 (West 1994).
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Unlike in New York courts, government defendants in federal
court do not get a special automatic stay when they appeal. To
obtain a stay longer than ten days, or to obtain any stay of an in-
junction or other order listed in Rule 62(a), government appellants
must apply for a court order. The government may only get special
treatment if it succeeds in obtaining a discretionary stay. If a gov-
emnment defendant gets such a stay, the government is exempt
from paying a bond or other security to the court.68
B. The Governmental Operations Rule Against Class Actions
The New York Court of Appeals holds that class certification is
generally inappropriate when a number of plaintiffs challenge a
governmental operation.69 Under CPLR 901,70 one or more par-
ties may sue or be sued as representatives of a class if, among other
things,71 "a class action is superior to other available methods for
the fair and effective adjudication of the controversy. '' 72 Although
68. See FED. R. Civ. P. 62(e).
69. See, e.g., Martin V. Lavine, 39 N.Y.2d 72, 346 N.E.2d 794, 382 N.Y.S.2d 956
(1976) (denying class status to chronically ill patients challenging state Department of
Social Services Commissioner's determination that they were not entitled to "pass
along" granted by Congress); Jones v. Berman, 37 N.Y.2d 42, 332 N.E.2d 303, 371
N.Y.S.2d 422 (1975) (state Aid to Dependant Children recipients challenging denial
of emergency aid when destitution is due to loss, theft or diversion of past grant);
Rivera v. Trimarco, 36 N.Y.2d 747, 329 N.E.2d 661, 368 N.Y.S.2d 826 (1975) (petition-
ers challenging denial of manual stenographic record (rather than a mechanically re-
corded record) of court proceedings) (dictum) (per curiam).
70. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. § 901 (McKinney 1996).
71. Parties seeking class certification must also meet the following requirements:
numerosity of the class; commonality of the class's questions of law or fact; typicality
of the representative parties' claims or defenses; and fair and adequate representation
by the representative parties. Id. at § 901(a)(1-4). The rule also makes an' exception
for actions to recover a penalty or minimum measure of recovery under a statute. See
id.
72. Id. at § 901(a)(5). CPLR 901 is based on FRCP 23, with a few differences. See
Brandon v. Chefetz, 106 A.D.2d 162, 485 N.Y.S.2d 55 (1st Dep't 1985) ("CPLR Arti-
cle 9 is modeled on Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."). First, while
section 901 includes all of the requirements of Rule 23(a) (numerosity, commonality,
typicality, and adequacy of the named representatives), see FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a),
Rule 23 requires, in addition, that the action fit into one of the 23(b) categories: sepa-
rate actions would risk inconsistent or varying adjudications (23(b)(1)(a)); one class
member's judgment would hurt the others' ability to protect their interests because of
multiple claimants to a limited fund (23(b)(1)(b)); injunctive or declaratory, class-
wide relief is appropriate (23(b)(2)); common questions predominate so that the class
action is superior to other methods of adjudication (23(b)(3)). See FED. R. Civ. P.
23(b).
Next, to avoid this classification scheme and any overlapping that may occur within
it, 2 NEW YORK CIVIL PRACnCE, supra note 48, 901.02, at 9-10 (citing N.Y.S. Judi-
cial Conference Report to the 1975 Legislature in Relation to the C.P.L.R., Leg. Doc.
251 (1975) [hereinafter N.Y.S. Judicial Conference Report], § 901 does not categorize
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CPLR 901 does not explicitly mandate that class actions against the
government are inferior to individual actions, courts that deny class
status to parties suing the government generally hold that class ac-
tions are not "superior" to other methods of proceeding.73
New York courts have held that these class actions are not supe-
rior because the doctrine of stare decisis renders them unneces-
sary.74  A successful' individual challenge to a governmental
class actions like Rule 23(b), but rather it contains as further prerequisites to class
status Rule 23(b)'s predominance and superiority requirements. See N.Y. CIv. PRAC.
L. & R. § 901(a)(2), (a)(5) (McKinney 1996). Interpreting the superiority require-
ment, the New York Court of Appeals, in Rivera, 36 N.Y.2d 747, 329 N.E.2d 661, 368
N.Y.S.2d 826, created the governmental operations rule against class actions.
73. Use of this doctrine has been widespread in New York. See, e.g., Conrad v.
Hackett, 184 A.D.2d 995, 584 N.Y.S.2d 241 (4th Dep't 1992) (denying class status to
institutionalized Medicaid recipients whose income the state Department of Social
Services had refused to allocate to recipient's spouse for maintenance needs); Brady
v. State, 172 A.D.2d 17, 576 N.Y.S.2d 896 (3d Dep't 1991) (nonresidents unlawfully
required to file joint tax returns with their nonresident taxpayer spouses); McCain v.
Koch, 117 A.D.2d 198, 502 N.Y.S.2d 720 (1st Dep't 1986) (homeless families with
children denied emergency shelter), rev'd on other grounds, 70 N.Y.2d 109, 511
N.E.2d 62, 517 N.Y.S.2d 918 (1987); Suffolk Hous. Servs. v. Town of Brookhaven, 69
A.D.2d 242, 418 N.Y.S.2d 452 (2d Dep't) (residents of low income housing units chal-
lenging racially exclusionary zoning practices), appeal dismissed, 48 N.Y.2d 652, 421
N.Y.S.2d 202 (1979), appeal dismissed, 49 N.Y.2d 799, 426 N.Y.S.2d 735 (1980); Maz-
zie v. Staszak, 85 Misc. 2d 24, 379 N.Y.S.2d 624 (Sup. Ct. Schenectady County 1975)
(home relief recipients denied emergency assistance without an immediate or pre-
ferred hearing).
74. See, e.g., Jiggetts v. Grinker, 148 A.D.2d 1, 21, 543 N.Y.S.2d 414, 425 (1st
Dep't 1989) (denying class certification to AFDC recipients challenging social service
agencies' policy and practice of denying grants to families whose monthly rent ex-
ceeded their monthly shelter allowances), rev'd on other grounds, 75 N.Y.2d 411, 553
N.E.2d 570, 554 N.Y.S.2d 92 (1990); Cohen v. D'Elia, 55 A.D.2d 617, 389 N.Y.S.2d
406 (2d Dep't 1976) (supplemental security income recipients challenging officials'
practice of requiring recipients to reestablish their Medicaid eligibility prior to admis-
sion into a nursing home); Darns v. Sabol, 165 Misc. 2d 77, 84, 627 N.Y.S.2d 526, 531
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1995) (HIV-infected housing assistance applicants seeking dec-
laration that they were entitled to emergency assistance).
For a discussion criticizing the use of stare decisis as a substitute for class certifica-
tion, see Daan Braveman, Class Certification in State Court Welfare Litigation: A Re-
quest for Procedural Justice, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 57 (1979).
Braveman points out that applying the stare decisis rationale of Rivera, 36 N.Y.2d
747, 329 N.E.2d 661, 368 N.Y.S.2d 826, the first case in which the Court of Appeals
used the governmental operations rule, to later cases ignores an important difference
between Rivera and the later cases. The defendants in Rivera were judges, who were
bound by stare decisis to follow the rules of the Court of Appeals. Braveman, supra,
at 64. The defendants in Jones v. Berman, 37 N.Y.2d 42, 332 N.E.2d 303, 371
N.Y.S.2d 422 (1975), which was the second case in which the Court of Appeals used
the governmental operations rule, were welfare officials. Braveman, supra, at 64.
Stare decisis will not bind these officials until the plaintiffs excluded from the original
suit bring a separate action based on the holding in the original suit. Id. at 64-65. In
Rivera, stare decisis forced the defendants to apply the relief to all affected parties.
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operation changes the government practice at issue.75 Courts have
held that, under stare decisis, individual relief will flow to others
similarly situated76 because the government should apply its poli-
cies equally to all citizens."
1. Existing Means of Relief from the Governmental Operations
Rule
Plaintiffs seeking class certification against a government defend-
ant must fit into one of the judicial exceptions to the governmental
operations rule. New York courts have established four excep-
tions78 for situations in which stare decisis will not adequately pro-
tect potential plaintiffs. Courts have certified class actions over
governmental operations where: (1) the plaintiffs are elderly indi-
viduals with limited ability to pursue separate actions;79 (2) plain-
tiffs show that the state is unlikely to comply with the order coming
from the individual suit;80 (3) the government defendant is joined
in the lawsuit with a private party;81 and (4) plaintiffs seek not only
Id. at 64. In Jones, however, stare decisis forced the defendants to apply the relief to
only those parties who were able to pursue separate actions against the government.
Id. at 65.
75. See 2 NEw YORK CIVIL PRACTICE, supra note 48, 901.20, at 9-97.
76. See Martin v. Lavine, 39 N.Y.2d 72, 75, 346 N.E.2d 794, 796, 382 N.Y.S.2d 956,
958 (1976).
77. See 2 NEW YORK CIVIL PRACrICE, supra note 48, 901.20, at 9-97 (citing
Martin, 39 N.Y.2d 72, 346 N.E.2d 794, 382 N.Y.S.2d 956).
78. A possible fifth exception exists for cases involving numerous government
agencies or officials, each one of which would not necessarily be bound by a judgment
against the other. The court in Rivera v. Bane, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 15, 1993, at 22, n.1
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1993), referred to this exception in a footnote. In addition, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals used the rationale behind this exception to justify
certifying a class in Marcera v. Chinlund, 595 F.2d 1231 (2d Cir.) (certifying a class of
pretrial detainees suing a defendant class consisting of all New York state counties
and sheriffs not permitting contact visits who were not involved in related past or
concurrent litigation), vacated on other grounds, 422 U.S. 915 (1979). No New York
state court, however, has ever certified a class on this basis.
79. See Tindell v. Koch, 164 A.D.2d 689, 565 N.Y.S.2d 789 (1st Dep't 1991); Kup-
persmith v. Perales, 145 A.D.2d 1005, 535 N.Y.S.2d 510 (1st Dep't 1988); Brown v.
Wing, 649 N.Y.S.2d 988 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1996).
80. See Lamboy v. Gross, 126 A.D.2d 265, 513 N.Y.S.2d 393 (1st Dep't 1987);
Eisenstark v. Anker, 64 A.D.2d 924, 408 N.Y.S.2d 129 (2d Dep't 1978).
81. See Bryant Ave. Tenants' Ass'n v. Koch, 71 N.Y.2d 856, 522 N.E.2d 1041, 527
N.Y.S.2d 743 (1988) (holding that low income, rent-stabilized tenants may pursue a
class action to challenge the validity of a statutory rent adjustment provision against
their landlords, the City of New York and various city departments); Goodwin v.
Gleidman, 119 Misc. 2d 538, 463 N.Y.S.2d 693 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983) (certifying
a class of plaintiffs suing both the Department of Housing Preservation and Develop-
ment and a private corporation over the termination of plaintiffs' right to remain in a
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declaratory and injunctive relief but also money damages for each
member of the class.82
Despite the liberal purpose of CPLR 901,83 courts have applied
the exceptions narrowly.' For example, the court in Rivera v.
Bane85 refused to certify a class of public assistance recipients chal-
lenging the New York State Department of Social Services' refusal
to supply them with access to their case records.86 Although plain-
tiffs were "indigent, disadvantaged individuals, many of whom
[were] elderly, '87 they did not satisfy the exception for parties with
limited ability to pursue separate actions.88 In addition, despite a
documented history of denials of access to case records, the plain-
tiffs did not meet the required showing of agency noncompliance. 89
2. The Purpose of the Governmental Operations Rule
The purpose of the governmental operations rule is to prevent
unnecessary costs to the government. When the Legislature en-
acted CPLR 901, government officials assumed class actions would
apply to them.90 They also believed class actions would be expen-
sive.91 Along with the anticipated increase in the number of class
actions under section 901,92 officials feared the expensive attor-
neys' fees possible in class actions.93 Despite a general legislative
housing shelter, because otherwise plaintiffs would have to bring two separate
actions).
82. See Dudley v. Kerwick, 84 A.D.2d 884, 444 N.Y.S.2d 965 (3d Dep't 1981).
83. See infra note 94.
84. This narrow use of the exceptions may reflect the historic hostility to class
actions. "[F]ew procedural devices have been the subject of more widespread criti-
cism and more sustained attack - and equally spirited defense - [than class actions
have] .... American Bar Association, Report of Pound Conference Follow-up Task
Force, 74 F.R.D. 159, 194 (1976). Some have even characterized class actions as de-
vices to promote "leftist-socialist causes." H.R. No. 247, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 26, re-
printed in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3872, 3894 (minority view of Rep.
Landgrebe).
85. N.Y. L.J., Oct. 15, 1993, at 22 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1993).
86. See id.
87. Id.
88. The court distinguished Kuppersmith v. Perales, 145 A.D.2d 1005, 535
N.Y.S.2d 510 (1st Dep't 1988), a case certifying a class of elderly plaintiffs: "Unlike
the proposed class members here, the home care recipients in Kuppersmith presented
such an extreme case that the court found their situation to constitute an exception to
the government operations rule." Rivera, N.Y. L.J. at 22.
89. See id.
90. Braveman, supra note 74, at 67.
91. Id.
92. See infra note 94.
93. Braveman, supra note 74, at 67. At the time of CPLR 901's enactment, coun-
sel in class actions generally received fees calculated as a percentage (within the range
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climate of expanding class actions,94 the New York Court of Ap-
peals believed that class actions against the government were un-
necessary 95  and that preventing these actions against the
government would save money and avoid other administrative
costs associated with class actions.96
of ten to thirty percent) of the judgment or settlement. According to one commenta-
tor, this approach typically resulted in a "windfall to plaintiffs counsel." Joseph M.
McLaughlin, Supplementary Practice Commentaries, N.Y. CiV. PRAC. L. & R. § 909,
at 125 (McKinney Supp. 1990). Though New York courts eventually began to detract
from this approach, see Washington Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Village Mall Town-
houses, Inc., 90 Misc. 2d 227, 394 N.Y.S.2d 772 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1977) (trial
court held full evidentiary hearing to approve the fee award, which was based on the
hourly rates plus incidental costs), class certification could still increase attorneys'
fees, because it allowed plaintiffs who would be excluded from the individual suit to
recover attorneys' fees. See Suffolk Hous. Servs. v. Town of Brookhaven, 69 A.D.2d
242, 418 N.Y.S.2d 452 (2d Dep't 1979) (denying class status when the only practical
purpose of a class would be to recover attorneys' fees), appeal dismissed, 48 N.Y.2d
652, 421 N.Y.S.2d 202 (1979), appeal dismissed, 49 N.Y.2d 799, 426 N.Y.S.2d 735
(1980).
Today, the rationale of avoiding class action fee awards by preventing class actions
over governmental operations no longer applies. In 1989, the New York Legislature
enacted the "Equal Access to Justice Act," which provides for an award of attorneys'
fees to parties suing the state. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. §§ 8600-05 (McKinney 1997).
94. CPLR 901 was meant to expand the availability of class actions. It was a lib-
eral response to past, restrictive treatment of class actions. The section's immediate
predecessor, CPLR 1005, was interpreted narrowly by the courts and thus prevented
many uses of the class action that are important today. Courts interpreted the statute
as preventing: "'the use of the class action device in the adjudication of such typically
modern claims as those associated with mass exposure to environmental offenses, vio-
lations of consumer rights, civil rights cases, the execution of adhesion contracts and a
multitude of other collective activities reaching Virtually every phase of human life."'
2 NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE, supra note'48, 901.01, at 9-8 (quoting N.Y.S. Judicial
Conference Report, supra note 72, at Leg. Doc. 90, 232, 248).
In light of the need for "a more liberal procedure," Moore v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 33 N.Y.2d 304, 313, 307 N.E.2d 554, 558, 352 N.Y.S.2d 433, 439 (1973), the Legis-
lature enacted a new Article 9 entitled "Class Actions." Act of June 17, 1975, ch. 207,
1975 N.Y. Laws 313 (McKinney). The drafters of the new law intended it to provide
the necessary flexibility to courts so that "class actions could qualify without the pres-
ent undesirable and socially detrimental restrictions." N.Y.S. Judicial Conference Re-
port, supra note 72, at 250. Thus, courts were supposed to "liberally construe[ ]"
Article 9. 2 NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE, supra note 48, 901.01, at 9-9.
For detailed discussions of New York class action procedure before the Legislature
enacted CPLR 901, see Adolf Homburger, The 1975 New York Judicial Conference
Package: Class Actions and Comparative Negligence, 25 BUFF. L. REV. 415 (1976), and
Adolf Homburger, State Class Actions and the Federal Rule, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 609
(1971).
95. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
96. See Martin v. Lavine, 39 N.Y.2d 72, 75, 346 N.E.2d 794, 796, 382 N.Y.S.2d 956,
958 (1976) (holding that "there is no compelling need to grant class action relief... in
light of the enormity of the administrative problem which would be posed in imple-
menting this decision and the fact that future petitioners may rely on our
determination").
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3. Class Actions over Governmental Operations in Federal Court
Federal rules do not bar class actions over governmental opera-
tions. In federal court, actions challenging government practices
need not pass a superiority requirement. Actions for injunctive re-
lief are Rule 23(b)(2) actions,97 which are not subject to the superi-
ority requirements of Rule 23(b)(3). 98
Although some federal courts have held that class actions were
unnecessary in suits against public officials for injunctive or declar-
atory relief,99 federal courts have rejected the governmental opera-
tions rule as a per se bar to class status. 100 Federal courts that have
denied class certification in challenges to a governmental operation
have required the government defendant to affirmatively assure
the court that the judgment would apply to all potential plaintiffs
affected by the challenged policy.1 1 In contrast, New York state
courts have denied class certification even in cases where a public
official does not assure the court that the final judgment would ap-
ply to all potential class members. 10 2
97. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
98. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
99. See United Farmworkers v. City of Delray Beach, 493 F.2d 799, 812 (5th Cir.
1974); Galvan v. Levine, 490 F.2d 1255, 1261 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 936
(1974).
100. See Morel v. Giuliani, 927 F. Supp. 622, 634 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that the
government's argument that stare decisis would protect future plaintiffs "ignores the
many cases allowing class actions to seek injunctive relief against government agen-
cies") (citing Robidoux v. Celani, 987 F.2d 931 (2d Cir. 1993) (certifying class of pub-
lic assistance recipients challenging state delays in processing applications) and Cutler
v. Perales, 128 F.R.D. 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (Medicaid recipients challenging timeliness
of city's compliance with state fair hearing decisions)); Barnett v. Brown, 794 F.2d 17
(2d Cir. 1986) (certifying class of Social Security Disability claimants who had suffered
substantial delays in the scheduling and issuance of decisions); Brown v. Giuliani, 138
F.R.D. 251 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (AFDC recipients challenging city's failure to process
AFDC grants in a timely fashion); Jane B. v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs.,
117 F.R.D. 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (juveniles challenging conditions at centers for adoles-
cent girls with behavioral and emotional problems); see also Haskins v. Stanton, 794
F.2d 1273 (7th Cir. 1986) (food stamp recipients suing state and county agencies for
violating federal standards for timeliness and bilingual assistance).
101. See, e.g., Hurley v. Ward, 584 F.2d 609, 611 (2d Cir. 1978); Bacon v. Toia, 437
F. Supp. 1371, 1383 n.11 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff d, 580 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1978).
102. See, e.g., Martin v. Lavine, 39 N.Y.2d 72, 346 N.E.2d 794, 382 N.Y.S.2d 956
(1976).
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II. The Impact of New York's Automatic Stay and
Governmental Operations Rule on the Poor'0 3
A. The Government's Automatic Stay
Even though many automatically-stayed orders are preliminary
injunctions and temporary restraining orders,1° where a trial court
necessarily finds that plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm if they
do not get relief immediately,0 5 the automatic stay usually
postpones relief for a long period of time. Three departments of
the Appellate Division give parties nine months to file all papers
necessary for an appeal,' °6 and the Second Department, the one
with the largest backlog, gives parties six months.10 7 These gener-
ous periods, which the court often extends, 08 are much longer than
federal time periods' 9 and are often too long for low income plain-
tiffs to survive without relief.
The automatic stay often leaves poor plaintiffs without shelter or
subsistence benefits for six to nine months. In McCain v. Giu-
liani,110 homeless families with children challenged New York
103. This Note focuses on the impact of the two New York rules on plaintiffs with
little or no income, both because these plaintiffs have such a great likelihood of facing
the rules in court, and because these plaintiffs are the most vulnerable ones who face
the two rules. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
Some of the problems with the two rules, however, affect all plaintiffs. For
example, it forces all plaintiffs suing the government to prove their cases twice. After
a plaintiff proves her case against the government and wins at trial, she must prove it
again to an appellate judge to avoid the stay. In most other cases, however, after a
plaintiff has proved her case at trial, the defendant has the burden to prove its case if
it wishes to prevail. Thus, appeals from most judgments assume that the trial court is
correct. Appeals from a judgment against the government assume the trial court is
incorrect.
104. See, e.g., Rent Stabilization Ass'n of N.Y. v. Higgins, 164 A.D.2d 283, 562
N.Y.S.2d 962 (1st Dep't 1990) (CPLR § 5519(a)(1) automatically stayed order
(deemed a preliminary injunction) extending temporary restraining order prohibiting
appellant from implementing housing regulation), affd, 83 N.Y.2d 156, 630 N.E.2d
626, 608 N.Y.S.2d 930 (1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2693 (1994).
105. See DeLury v. City of New York, 48 A.D.2d 405, 405, 370 N.Y.S.2d 600, 602
(1st Dep't 1975) ("[T]he prospect of irreparable harm, [is] sine qua non for injunction
pending trial.").
106. These are the First, Third and Fourth departments. See N.Y. C-. RULES,
§§ 600.11(a)(3) (1st Dep't), 800.12 (3d Dep't), 1000.3(b)(2)(i) (4th Dep't) (West
1997).
107. See N.Y. Or. RULES, § 670.8(e).
108. Lowry, supra note 3, at 12. Also, the time period may be further lengthened if
the nine month period would end in the summer. Since appellate courts usually do
not sit over the summer, the period would be extended until the new term begins.
109. Id
110. N.Y. L.J., May 16, 1996, at 28 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1996), affd, 653 N.Y.S.2d
556 (1st Dep't 1997).
1996] RULES PROTECTING THE GOVERNMENT 153
City's policy of housing them overnight in a dangerous welfare of-
fice (the Emergency Assistance Unit ("EAU"))."' The New York
Supreme Court ordered the City to place all eligible families in
suitable emergency shelter within twenty four hours.112 However,
even though the courts in McCain have agreed that the harm to a
family kept in the EAU is irreparable," 3 CPLR 5519(a)(1) stayed
the order. The automatic stay forced the plaintiffs to suffer severe
food 14 and sleep 15 deprivations, along with general stress and anx-
iety,116 while they were kept in the EAU. 117
1. Inadequacy of Plaintiffs Existing Means of Relief
Plaintiffs affected by the automatic stay have two possible means
of relief: the small business exception and vacatur. 1 8 Both reme-
dies, however, are inadequate to protect poor plaintiffs whose re-
covery is threatened by the stay. First, low income plaintiffs do not
get the benefit of the small business exception;1 9 only small busi-
nesses whose license reinstatement is stayed may use this excep-
tion.120  The New York Legislature, recognizing in the small
business exception the potentially harsh consequences of the auto-
matic stay on small businesses, fails to provide similar protection to
low income plaintiffs.
Vacatur is also an inadequate remedy for low income plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs challenging the automatic stay face a heightened bur-
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See McCain v. Koch, 117 A.D.2d 198, 211-16, 502 N.Y.S.2d 720, 727-31 (1st
Dep't 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 70 N.Y.2d 109, 511 N.E.2d 62, 517 N.Y.S.2d 918
(1987).
114. For example, fifty three percent of mothers surveyed ate no more than once a
day while being kept at the EAU. ANNA LOU DEHAVENON, ACTION RESEARCH PRO-
JECT ON HUNGER, HOMELESSNESS, AND FAMILY HEALTH, OUT IN THE COLD: THE
SOCIAL EXCLUSION OF NEW YORK CITY'S HOMELESS FAMILIES IN 1995 67-68 (1995).
115. For example, fifty three percent of the parents surveyed had not slept more
than three hours a night for the three nights before being surveyed. Id. at 72.
116. Id. at 77-78.
117. The plaintiffs' desperate situation in McCain illustrates a criticism of the New
York Legislature's removal of the provision limiting the automatic stay to money and
property judgments. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text. One commenta-
tor has called this removal "most unfortunate." 7 NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE, supra
note 48, 5519.03, at 55-183. Without the limit, the stay risks harm to parties like the
families in McCain where, were the court to balance the equities, a court would deny
a motion for the stay. Id. at 55-183-84.
118. See supra Part I.A.1.
119. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
120. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. § 5519(a)(1) (McKinney 1996).
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den 121 because of the policy of stabilizing the government after an
adverse judgment or order. 2 2 Because of this policy, stays under
CPLR 5519(a)(1) are "not lightly to be vacated.' l2 3 In addition, by
permitting only the court to which the appeal is taken to vacate an
automatic stay, CPLR 5519(c) makes it more difficult for section
5519(a)(1) plaintiffs to vacate a stay than it is for all other plaintiffs.
After the defendant gets a stay, non-5519(a)(1) plaintiffs may re-
turn to the judge who granted the original relief and ask that judge
to preserve her own order by vacating the stay.2 4  Section
5519(a)(1) plaintiffs, however, may only try to meet the heightened
vacatur standard in front of an appellate judge, who is less likely to
be as familiar as the trial judge with the facts necessitating the orig-
inal injunction.
Finally, a common result of a motion to vacate the automatic
stay is a grant of the motion unless the government expedites its
appeal.12 5 The stay of the plaintiff's order actually remains in effect
while the state may perfect its appeal in a time period still longer
than the time allowed to perfect a federal appeal.12 6
B. The Governmental Operations Rule Against Class Actions
By limiting class actions, the governmental operations rule re-
stricts court access to many poor people who are unable to afford
individual representation. Once denied participation in a class ac-
tion, a poor plaintiff may be unable to obtain the legal services
necessary to take advantage of the protections of stare decisis. 127
In addition, even if a plaintiff obtains legal services, the govern-
mental operations rule postpones the plaintiff's relief by forcing
plaintiffs to rely on government compliance with the decision from
121. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
123. DeLury v. City of New York, 48 A.D.2d 405, 405, 370 N.Y.S.2d 600, 602 (1st
Dep't 1975).
124. These plaintiffs, however, face the difficulty of challenging stays that have al-
ready been deliberated on by a court. Although such stays may have more merit in
the balance of the equities than automatic stays, these plaintiffs still have a greater
right to challenge a stay than § 5519(a)(1) plaintiffs, who may only ask the appellate
court to vacate a stay.
125. See, e.g., Rent Stabilization Ass'n of N.Y. v. Higgins, 164 A.D.2d 283, 290, 562
N.Y.S.2d 962, 966 (1st Dep't 1990), aff'd, 83 N.Y.2d 156, 630 N.E.2d 626, 608 N.Y.S.2d
930 (1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2693 (1994).
126. See id. (April order provided that statutory stay would be vacated unless the
state perfected its appeal for the October term).
127. See supra note 8 and accompanying text, discussing the unmet legal need and
restrictions on legal services that illustrate the great likelihood that a poor plaintiff
will be unable to obtain legal services.
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the original lawsuit, allowing them to sue only if the government
fails to comply. By the time a plaintiff can take advantage of stare
decisis and recover based on the original lawsuit, the plaintiff will
have suffered irreparable harm. 28
1. Inadequacy of Plaintiffs Existing Means of Relief
Plaintiffs wishing to challenge a governmental operation as a
class may do so if they fit into one of four exceptions. 129 Poor
plaintiffs seeking only to change a governmental policy do not fit
into the exception for cases in which a private party joins the gov-
ernment as a defendant,'130 nor the exception for actions seeking
money judgments.' 31 Nonetheless, though the elderly plaintiff ex-
ception and the agency noncompliance exception may be more rel-
evant to the poor, both provide insufficient protection to potential
class members.
The elderly exception is unnecessarily narrow and too accepting
of state noncompliance. In Tindell v. Koch, 32 a group of senior
citizens challenging New York City's method of calculating rent in-
creases for rent stabilized apartments fit into this exception. 33
However, the New York County Supreme Court, in Rivera v.
Bane,3 refused to apply the exception to indigent plaintiffs, many
of whom were elderly, challenging the State's noncompliance with
laws requiring it to provide access to public assistance records. 135
The court refused to include poor plaintiffs in the exception cover-
ing parties unable to pursue separate actions. The court gave no
reason why an elderly plaintiff would necessarily have a more diffi-
cult time bringing a separate lawsuit than a poor plaintiff. By as-
128. See supra notes 110-17 and accompanying text, discussing the irreparable harm
homeless families suffer each day the City of New York forces them to stay in the
EAU.
129. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
130. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
131. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
132. 164 A.D.2d 689, 565 N.Y.S.2d 789 (1st Dep't 1991).
133. See id. at 698, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 794.
134. N.Y. L.J., Oct. 15, 1993, at 22 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1993).
135. See id. The court pointed out that, even under Tindell, class certification was
unnecessary as to the claim that the agency failed to adequately notify plaintiffs of
their rights to access their case records. Id. The Tindell court did not certify a class on
the claim alleging failure to adequately publicize the Senior Citizen Rent Increase
Exemption ("SCRIE") program. 164 A.D.2d at 695-96, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 793.
On the claim that the agency did not allow access to case records, the Rivera court
held that the plaintiffs failed to show that either they were unable to pursue separate
actions or that the agency was unlikely to comply with an order from the individual
suit. N.Y. L.J., Oct. 15, 1993, at 22.
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suming that all non-elderly plaintiffs are able to sue the
government separately, the court ignored the huge amount of un-
met legal need that exists for all the poor.136 In addition, by inter-
preting the elderly exception narrowly, the court contradicted the
liberal intent of CPLR 901.137
This exception also unnecessarily accepts government noncom-
pliance. Under the rationale behind the governmental operations
rule, once a court orders a governmental entity to change its policy,
that policy should apply to all others similarly situated under stare
decisis. 138 Arguing that non-elderly plaintiffs do not deserve class
certification because they can sue to enforce a court order readily
accepts the noncompliance that disproves the rationale behind the
governmental operations rule.' 39
In addition, courts have not clearly defined the showing required
to meet the noncompliance exception. Successful showings have
included an agency's own records demonstrating its noncompliance
with orders directing it to place homeless families in suitable shel-
ter 140 and court records demonstrating a prison's history of non-
compliance with both court orders and its own regulations. 141 An
example of an unsuccessful showing, however, highlights the po-
tential inconsistencies in applying the noncompliance exception. In
Rivera, plaintiffs claimed that the defendant failed to comply with
laws requiring it provide access to case records.142 A copy of a
notice from the defendant failing to mention a right to receive doc-
uments by mail, along with affidavits from several legal services
organizations documenting defendant's history of refusing and/or
failing to provide access to case records failed to represent a suffi-
cient showing.' 43 Thus, no clear standard exists that defines when
courts should apply the noncompliance exception.
136. See supra note 8.
137. See supra note 94.
138. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
139. See Seittelman v. Sabol, 158 Misc. 2d 498, 601 N.Y.S.2d 391 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1993) (dicta) (certifying a class of Medicaid recipients challenging an aspect of
the Medicaid program where agency did not show it would comply with an order
coming from an individual suit).
140. See Lamboy v. Gross, 126 A.D.2d 265, 513 N.Y.S.2d 393 (1st Dep't 1987).
141. See Ode v. Smith, 118 Misc. 2d 617, 461 N.Y.S.2d 684 (Sup. Ct. Wyo. County
1983).
142. N.Y. L.J., Oct. 15, 1993, at 22 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1993).
143. Id.
156
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IH. Proposals For Reform
The automatic stay and the governmental operations rule deny
recovery to low income plaintiffs without providing them adequate
means of relief from the rules. The automatic stay risks causing
serious harm to poor plaintiffs by postponing needed court re-
lief.144 The small business exception and the vacatur remedy, while
representing a concern for private parties, do not adequately pro-
tect plaintiffs needing immediate recovery.145 The governmental
operations rule restricts needed court access to many plaintiffs un-
able to pursue individual lawsuits.146 The exceptions for elderly
plaintiffs and cases of likely noncompliance, however, exclude
many plaintiffs who are unable to force compliance on their own.147
To remedy the harsh effects of these two rules, the Legislature and
courts should consider two proposals for reform.148
144. See supra notes 104-117 and accompanying text.
145. See supra Part II.A.1.
146. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
147. See supra Part II.B.1.
148. An additional proposal, beyond the scope of the New York State Legislature
and Court of Appeals, is to increase federal court access. Such a proposal, however, is
an inadequate solution to the problems caused by the two rules.
Increasing access to federal courts would allow more New York plaintiffs to avoid
the automatic stay and the governmental operations rule. Plaintiffs in federal court
face a stay longer than ten days only when the government proves to the court that
the need for a stay outweighs the plaintiffs' need for immediate relief. See supra Part
I.A.3. If the plaintiffs' relief takes the form of an injunction, then the government will
not get even the ten day stay unless it proves to the court that the balance of the
equities favors granting a stay. See supra Part I.A.3. For plaintiffs seeking to sue the
government as a class, a federal court would not deny class certification simply be-
cause a governmental operation is at issue. See supra Part I.B.3. As long as these
plaintiffs satisfied the other general requirements for class actions, they would be able
to obtain class-wide relief against a government defendant. See supra Part I.B.3.
Simply allowing more plaintiffs to sue in federal court, however, is neither an ade-
quate nor realistic proposal. Increasing federal court access does not help the many
plaintiffs who would still be forced to sue in New York state courts. In addition, the
current trend is to restrict, rather than increase, federal court access. Such restrictions
include the creation and expansion of federal abstention doctrine, see Colorado River
Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976); Huffman v. Pursue,
Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943); Railroad Com-
mission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941), and limits on: subject matter jurisdiction,
see Redish, supra note 9, at 1787-1810; Congress' power to create a federal cause of
action, see Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996); federal courts'
power to award injunctive relief against state officers on the basis of state law, see
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984); and federal courts'
power to order state officials to pay retroactive benefits to a recipient under a federal
program, see Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). Proposals to increase access,
therefore, are likely to fail.
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A. Improving Poor Person's Exceptions
Improving exceptions for the poor would increase the situations
in which deserving poor plaintiffs may find relief from the auto-
matic stay or governmental operations rule. If the Legislature cre-
ated a poor person's exception to the automatic stay, similar to the
small business exception, 149 poor plaintiffs would obtain relief
much sooner than under current law. 150 In addition, if courts ap-
plied the executory/prohibitory distinction,'-" sometimes used to
exempt trial and pretrial proceedings from the automatic stay, to
exempt all prohibitory orders, many low income plaintiffs would be
able to avoid the stay. 152
In cases where 'poor plaintiffs seek to pursue a class action
against the government, courts could extend to the poor existing
exceptions for either elderly plaintiffs or cases of likely governmen-
tal noncompliance. 153 First, because the rationale behind the eld-
erly plaintiff exception is these plaintiffs' inability to pursue
separate lawsuits, 415 courts could exempt from the governmental
operations rule all poor plaintiffs who cannot afford to bring a sep-
arate lawsuit. Second, courts could clarify the standard necessary
for a plaintiff to show a likelihood of governmental noncompli-
ance. 55 Courts would apply the noncompliance exception more
consistently and poor plaintiffs would be more aware of the proof
needed to fit into the exception.
Creating exceptions to the rules, however, fails to provide an ad-
equate solution. Carving out a poor person's exception to the au-
tomatic stay will create an unnecessary procedural step. In cases
where the balance of the equities favors granting the government a
stay, the government will first have to litigate the question whether
the automatic stay or the exception applies, and then, if the excep-
tion applies, the government will have to apply for a discretionary
149. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
150. Under the small business exception, the automatic stay lasts only fifteen days.
See supra note 37 and accompanying text. Under current practice, the automatic stay
lasts as long as nine months. See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 17-32 and accompanying text.
152. Cases against the government often result in prohibitory orders that CPLR
5519(a)(1) stays. See, e.g., Rent Stabilization Ass'n of N.Y. v. Higgins, 164 A.D.2d
283, 562 N.Y.S.2d 962 (1st Dep't 1990) (section 5519(a)(1) stayed order prohibiting
defendant from implementing its emergency housing. rules), affd, 83 N.Y.2d 156, 630
N.E.2d 626, 608 N.Y.S.2d 930 (1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2693 (1994).
153. See supra Part I.B.1.
154. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
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stay.156 Simply letting a court decide if the government deserves a
discretionary stay, in the first place, would avoid the unnecessary
intermediate step of ruling on the automatic stay. In addition, the
executory/prohibitory distinction is an inadequate solution. Be-
cause a court can easily phrase the same order in either executory
or prohibitory language, a significant likelihood exists that courts
may apply a prohibitory exception to the automatic stay
inconsistently. 157
Exceptions are also inadequate alternatives to the current gov-
ernmental operations rule. The elderly plaintiff exception, even if
it applied to poor people, accepts and relies on governmental non-
compliance.' 58 Additionally, although clarifying the standard used
in the noncompliance exception would undoubtedly benefit poor
plaintiffs, no exception to the governmental operations rule could
cure the basic flaw in the way courts have applied the rule. When a
court denies class status on the belief that a changed government
policy will affect all potential class members, the court assumes the
lawsuit is a dispute about the interpretation of a law, rather than
noncompliance with a law.' 59 Courts applying the governmental
operations rule rely on the premise that, in the case before them,
they will make a "determination ... [upon which all] future peti-
tioners may rely."'160 If the plaintiffs challenge the very fact that
156. See N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 5519(c) (McKinney 1996).
157. Some courts have been hesitant to apply automatic stays based on the seman-
tic executory/prohibitory distinction. While the court in Paramount Pictures Corp. v.
Davis, 228 Cal. App. 2d 827 (1964), phrased in prohibitory 'terms the order enjoining
actress Bette Davis from working for any other company, the appellate court held
that the order was executory in purpose and effect. See id. The order would have
compelled Davis to do something (work for Paramount, the company with whom she
had signed a contract), rather than forcing her to stop doing something (working for
another company). Id.
158. See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
159. Federal courts, lacking a governmental operations rule, do not encounter this
problem. When a plaintiff challenges the government's noncompliance, the court
does not apply a rule that assumes the case will settle some dispute over interpreta-
tion. Rather, in noncompliance cases that meet the requirements of Rule 23, see FED.
R. Civ. P. 23, federal courts allow class actions to force compliance benefiting the
whole class.
For example, the court in Brown v. Giuliani, 158 F.R.D. 251 (E.D.N.Y. 1994), certi-
fied a class of AFDC recipients challenging New York City's failure to process their
grants in a timely fashion. The court added that "stare decisis is especially inappropri-
ate as grounds for denying class certification where the defendants have not indicated
whether they will abide by a court's decision should that court decide in favor of non-
class plaintiffs." Id at 269; see also Morel v. Giuliani, 927 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y.
1995) (certifying a class of AFDC recipients challenging the failure of New York City
and New York State to provide aid continuing benefits in a timely manner).
160. Rivera, N.Y. L.J. at 22.
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the state is not complying with the law, however, a legal interpreta-
tion is not at stake. Rather, the challenge requires an order that
simply directs the state to comply with existing law. 161 The govern-
mental operations rule, even with exceptions for poor plaintiffs,
will prevent class actions in noncompliance cases by viewing them
as interpretation cases.
B. Abolishing the Rules
Abolishing both rules is the better proposal to protect low in-
come plaintiffs. Legislators have tried several times to eliminate
the automatic stay. 162 Lawyers for low income plaintiffs have also
challenged the governmental operations rule by continuing to seek
class certification in lawsuits challenging governmental opera-
tions.163 Recent restrictions on legal services for the poor 61 make
it essential that the Legislature and the Court of Appeals abolish
both rules now. Preventing the government from postponing
needed relief will be crucial for the growing number of plaintiffs
who will be unable to obtain legal services. Allowing class certifi-
cation against the government is also important because poor
plaintiffs denied class status will be even less able than in the past
to pursue separate lawsuits and benefit from the protections of
stare decisis. If New York continues to apply these two rules, it
will cause severe hardship to an increasing number of poor
plaintiffs.
1. Abolishing the Government's Automatic Stay
The New York Legislature should repeal the automatic stay pro-
vision. If the government wishes to stay an adverse judgment, it
may apply for a discretionary stay under CPLR 5519(c). The court
161. In Rivera, although the plaintiffs sought declaratory relief, their central charge
was that the agency was not complying with laws requiring it to provide applicants
and recipients access to case records. As a result, plaintiffs sought an order that,
among other things, directed the agency to give them access to their records. Id.
162. See 1995 N.Y. A.B. 1783, introduced Jan. 25, 1995 (Assemblyman Seabrook)
(proposing elimination of the automatic stay); 1993 N.Y. A.B. 10701, introduced
March 29, 1994 (Seabrook) (elimination); 1991 N.Y. A.B. 1207, introduced Jan. 9,
1991 (Assemblyman Nadler) (proposing replacement of the automatic stay with a
preference in hearing the government's appeal when the discretionary stay is denied).
163. See, e.g., Darns v. Sabol, 165 Misc. 2d 77, 627 N.Y.S.2d 526 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1995) (refusing to certify a class of HIV-infected housing applicants seeking
declaration that they were entitled to emergency housing assistance).
164. See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-134, 110 U.S. Stat. 1321 (1996) (restricting use of funding to the Legal
Services Corporation).
160
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hearing the application will weigh the equities and grant a stay
based on the relative potential harms to each party.165
Abolishing the automatic stay may have two possible negative
consequences. First, the government may incur new costs from the
motion practice or security required for a stay. Second, the gov-
ernment may need to cut important social programs to pay the
costs of immediate compliance. Despite these two possible conse-
quences, abolishing the automatic stay is still the best solution. The
government can avoid the costs of posting security by applying for
a discretionary stay.166 If a court believes that the costs to the gov-
ernment outweigh the potential harm to plaintiffs, it will grant the
government a discretionary stay. A court may also grant a discre-
tionary stay if the government's fiscal situation would force it to cut
other necessary programs. 167 Finally, by decreasing the amount of
times the automatic stay will cause irreparable harm to poor plain-
tiffs, the Legislature will further the purpose of protecting vulnera-
ble private parties.168
2. Abolishing the Governmental Operations Rule
The New York Court of Appeals should eliminate its govern-
mental operations rule. The Court should rule that, under the per-
suasive authority of federal case law, 69 class actions challenging a
government practice are not necessarily inferior to other methods
of adjudication. As a result, courts will no longer apply the govern-
mental operations bar to class actions because they are not "supe-
rior.'' 170 Courts will be able to grant or deny such an action based
165. See N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. § 5519(c) (McKinney 1996).
166. See id.
167. At first glance, Mayor Rudolph Giuliani's recent actions concerning McCain v.
Giuliani, N.Y. U., May 16, 1996, at 28 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1996), affd, 653
N.Y.S.2d 556 (1st Dep't 1997), might seem to be an example of the government cut-
ting necessary services to pay the costs of compliance. After the court prohibited the
Mayor from forcing homeless families to stay at the EAU longer than a day or two, he
tightened the shelter eligibility rules to reduce the number of families entering the
EAU at all. This, however, is no reason to stay the order in McCain. Even after
changing the eligibility rules at the EAU, the Mayor has failed to place homeless
families with children into suitable shelter within the required time period. Also, the
budget surplus of fiscal year 1996 shows that the City of New York could have af-
forded to comply.
168. See supra notes 46-63 and accompanying text, discussing amendments to the
automatic stay that reflect an intention to protect private parties.
169. See, e.g., Morel v. Giuliani, 927 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Brown v. Giu-
liani, 158 F.R.D. 251 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
170. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 901(a)(5) (McKinney 1996).
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on whether the facts of the case fit into CPLR 901,171 regardless of
whether the defendant is the government.
TWo negative consequences may result from abolishing the gov-
ernmental operations rule: it may cause unnecessary class actions
and the government may incur new costs from the increase in class
actions. Neither consequence, however, renders abolishing the
governmental operations rule an inadequate solution. Abolishing
the rule will not create unnecessary class actions because the court
will still have the discretion to deny class status in cases where stare
decisis actually will force the defendants to comply. 172 In addition,
at least in the case of attorneys' fees, the government will not incur
new costs from additional class actions173 because the Equal Access
to Justice Act 174 already provides for these fees in governmental
operations cases.' 75
Conclusion
The automatic stay and the governmental operations rule un-
justly limit the ability of poor plaintiffs to recover in court. The
automatic stay postpones needed relief to plaintiffs who often de-
pend on court orders for their subsistence. The governmental op-
erations rule denies court access to plaintiffs who often cannot
afford legal services. Neither rule provides an adequate means of
relief to vulnerable plaintiffs who deserve an exception.
The best alternative to these two rules is to completely abolish
them. Simply improving poor person's exceptions to the rules does
not adequately solve all the problems the two rules have caused.
Abolishing the rules, on the other hand, gives courts the discretion
to choose, based on the merits of the case and public policy con-
cerns, when the poor and the government deserve protection.
Armed with this discretion, a court can protect low income plain-
tiffs from the delays of the automatic stay and the denials of the
governmental operations rule. If, however, the Legislature and the
Court of Appeals continue to force New York courts to apply these
harsh, automatic rules that favor the government, poor plaintiffs
171. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text, discussing § 901's requirements
for class status.
172. See Rivera v. Trimarco, 36 N.Y.2d 747, 329 N.E.2d 661, 368 N.Y.S.2d 826
(1975) (defendants were Civil Court judges who would be bound by stare decisis to
follow the orders of the Court of Appeals).
173. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text, discussing government officials'
early fear that CPLR 901 would cost the government a lot of money in attorneys' fees.
174. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. §§ 8600-05 (McKinney 1997).
175. See supra note 93.
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will continue to suffer. Denying immediate relief to poor plaintiffs
who need it, and court access to those who lack it, denies poor
plaintiffs the procedural justice they rely on to survive.

